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THE ROLE OF "STORIES" IN CIVIL JURYJUDGMENTS
Reid Hastie*
A brief review of psychological theories ofjuror decision making is followed by an
introduction to "explanation-based" theories of judgment. Prior empirical studies
of explanation-based processes in juror decision making are then reviewed. An
original empirical study of jurors' judgments concerning liability for punitive
damages is presented to illustrate the explanation-based approach to civil deci-
sions.
INTRODUCTION
How do ordinary people make judicial decisions? Though this
question is fundamental to any practical understanding of the role
and performance of lay juries, it does not yet have a definitive an-
swer. The answer is sure to be complex, however, as the human
mind is a very flexible device. Combined with the varied "cognitive
environment" of legal cases, the result is a great diversity of cogni-
tive patterns and strategies. Further uncertainty is introduced by
the diversity of experts' opinions about what kind of a descriptive
theory would be most useful. Even within psychology, only one of
the behavioral sciences that aspires to answer the question, there
are at least three different approaches to a theory ofjuror decision
making. We will review current models of juror decision making
and focus on the application of our own "explanation-based ap-
proach." An original study of mock-jurors' judgments of liability
for punitive damages will be described to illustrate this approach
and to argue for its value in explicating civil jury decision proc-
esses.
The first psychological approach to jury decision making is the
"catalog of facts" research tactic.' Dozens of empirical studies have
* Professor of Psychology and Director of the Center for Research on Judgment and
Policy, University of Colorado. A.B. 1968, Stanford University; M.A. 1970, University of Cali-
fornia at San Diego; Ph.D. 1973, Yale University. Funding for the empirical study of college
student mock-jurorjudgments described in this paper was provided by the National Science
Foundation (Grant No. SBR 9410288). The author would like to thank Phoebe Ellsworth,
Samuel Gross, Richard Lempert, Nancy Pennington, and the participants in the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform Symposium, "Jury Reform: Making Juries Work," for their
many useful comments on this paper. Of course, the conclusions of the paper should be
attributed only to the author.
1. See Reid Hastie, Introduction, in INSIDE THEJUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OFJUROR DE-
CISION MAKING 3,4 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
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been conducted to describe various facets of jury judgments: Can
jurors ignore legally proscribed but intuitively relevant evidence
when instructed to disregard it? Are obnoxious attorneys "shooting
themselves in the foot" with aggressive trial tactics? Do bifurcated
(liability decision separated from damages judgment) or unitary
trial procedures yield more plaintiffs' verdicts and higher awards?
Do authoritarian jurors render different verdicts than non-
authoritarian jurors?2 Do the forms of heuristic reasoning observed
in non-legal judgments also appear in juror decisions? These stud-
ies provide useful facts about juror and jury behavior, but they
have not led to the development of a general model of juror deci-
sion processes.
A second type of answer can be found in the form of algebraic
process models that describe the inferences made by jurors from
the evidence and other information in reaching their verdicts.3
Two traditions of algebraic modeling have been most popular:
models that are based on rational, Bayesian belief updating prin-
ciples derived from mathematical probability theory4 and models
that are based on robust, linear averaging combination rules.5 At
the moment, the linear models have been more successful than
the Bayesian models in describing jurors' decision processes in
empirical studies.6 In our view, these algebraic formulations are
useful models of the global judgment process, although we believe
that they are best viewed as descriptions of a generic process at a
level a few steps more abstract than the detailed "computations"
that are the most valid description of individual reasoning proc-
esses.7 Furthermore, these models focus on mental processes but,
for the most part, ignore the nature of jurors' mental representa-
2. See Carolyn B. Murray et al., The O.J. Simpson Verdict: Predictors of Beliefs About Inno-
cence or Guilt, 53 J. Soc. ISSUES 455, 458 (1997) ("The authoritarian personality is
characterized by racial prejudice, a pseudo-conservative world view, submission to authority,
and stereotypical beliefs." (citation omitted)).
3. See generally Reid Hastie, Algebraic Models ofJuror Decision Processes, in INSIDE THE JU-
ROR, supra note 1, at 84 [hereinafter Hastie, Algebraic Models].
4. See generally David A. Schum & Anne W. Martin, Formal and Empirical Research on
Cascaded Inference in Jurisprudence, 17 L. & Soc'Y REv. 105 (1982).
5. See Hastie, Algebraic Models, supra note 3, at 92-96.
6. See Schum & Martin, supra note 4, at 110-22. The most supportive empirical evi-
dence is an unpublished technical report. See David A. Schum & Anne W. Martin,
Probabilistic Opinion Revision on the Basis of Evidence at Trial: A Baconian or a Pascalian
Process? 70-76 (Oct. 1, 1980) (unpublished research report, on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
7. SeeJOHN R. ANDERSON, THE ADAPTIVE CHARACTER OF THOUGHT 3, 4 tbl.1-1, 5-31
(1990); Lola Lopes, Algebra and Process in the Modeling of Risky Choice, in DECISION MAKING
FROM A COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE 199, 199-216 (Jerome Busemeyer, Reid Hastie, & Douglas
L. Medin eds., 1995).
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tions and memories that also play a major role in complex legal
judgments."
A third answer to the question of how jurors think takes the
form of a cognitive description of the inferences or computations
that occur in an individual juror's mind.9 Our theory of juror deci-
sion processes is an example of this third approach. We call our
theory the "Story Model" because we claim the central cognitive
process in juror decision making is story construction-the crea-
tion of a narrative summary of the events under dispute. Our first
application of the Story Model to criminal judgments identified
three component processes: (1) evidence evaluation through story
construction, (2) representation of the decision alternatives
(verdicts) by learning their attributes or elements, and (3) reach-
ing a decision through the classification of the story into the best
fitting verdict category.10
These latter processes are likely to vary with the demands of dif-
ferent decision tasks. Some tasks involve a classification response,
some an estimate or judgment of a magnitude, and some a projec-
tion to future events. For example, the shift from criminal
judgments, where categorical verdicts play a prominent role, to
civil judgments, where degrees of responsibility play the analogous
role, changes these last stages. However, our fundamental assump-
tion, supported by the results of our empirical studies, is that many
decisions involve the story construction process assigned to the
first stage in the model. Thus, the central claim of the model is
that the story the juror constructs determines the juror's verdict.
More generally we claim that causal "situation models" play a cen-
tral role in many explanation-based decisions in legal, medical,
engineering, and financial circumstances.'
In our explanation-based model, the decision process is divided
into three stages: (1) construction of a summary explanation, (2)
determination of decision alternatives, and (3) mapping the
explanation onto a best-fitting decision alternative. 2 This subtask
framework contrasts with the continuous on-line updating
8. See generally Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Theory of Explanation-Based Decision
Making, in DECISION MAKING IN ACTION: MODELS AND METHODS 188 (Gary A. Klein et al.
eds., 1993) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Decision Making].
9. See STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 60-84 (1997) (defending "compu-
tational models" of human thought and behavior).
10. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory ofJuror Decision Making: The
Story Model, 13 CARDozo L. REv. 519, 520-29 (1991) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, The
Story Model].
11. See Pennington & Hastie, Decision Making, supra note 8, at 188-90.
12. See Pennington & Hastie, The Story Mode4 supra note 10, at 520-21.
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computation hypothesized by the algebraic model approaches.'3
Furthermore, we diverge sharply from traditional approaches with
our emphasis on the structure of memory representations as the
key determinant of decisions.14 We also depart from the common
assumption that, when causal reasoning is involved in judgment, it
can be described by algebraic, stochastic, or logical computations
that lead directly to a decision. 15 In our model, causal reasoning
plays a subordinate but critical role by guiding inferences in
evidence evaluation and construction of the intermediate
explanation.'6
An illustration of our focus on the role of narrative evidence
summaries is provided by an interpretation of the dramatic differ-
ences between white and African-American citizens' reactions to
the verdict in the O.J. Simpson murder trial.' 7 We hypothesize that
race made a difference in the construction and acceptance of the
"defense story" in which a racist police detective (Mark Fuhrman)
planted incriminating evidence. 8 African-Americans, compared to
white Americans, have many more beliefs and experiences that
support the plausibility of stories of police misconduct and police
bigotry.'9 Most African-Americans or members of their immediate
families have had negative, and possibly racist, encounters with
justice system authorities. ° African-Americans know of many more
stories (some apocryphal, some veridical) of police bigotry and
police brutality directed against members of their race than do
whites. 2 Thus, we speculate that this background of experience,
beliefs, and relevant stories made it easy for African-Americans to
13. See Reid Hastie & Bernadette Park, The Relationship Between Memory and Judgment
Depends on Whether the Judgment Task Is Memory-Based or On-Line, 93 PSYCHOL. REv. 258, 259
(1986).
14. See generally Reid Hastie & Nancy Pennington, A Cognitive Approach to Judgment and
Decision Making, in DECISION MAKING FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 1,
1-31 (Jerome R. Busemeyer et al. eds., 1995).
15. See generally Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Reasoning in Explanation-Based Deci-
sion Making, 49 COGNITION 123 (1993) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Reasoning].
16. See id.
17. See generally KD. Mixon et al., The Influence of Racial Similarity on the O.J. Simpson
Tria4, 10J. Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 481 (1995); see alsoJeffrey Toobin, A Horrible Human
Event, NEW YORKER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 40, 41. There even appeared to be differences on the
jury and within the defense team.
18. Note that the remainder of this section relies heavily on the author's previous
work in Reid Hastie & Nancy Pennington, The OJ Simpson Stories: Behavioral Scientists' Reflec-
tions on The People of the State of California v. Orenthal James Simpson, 67 U. COLO. L.
REv. 957, 972-73 (1996).
19. See id. at 973 (citing Henry L. Gates, Jr., Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man,
NEW YORKER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 56, 58-59).
20. See id.
21. See id. (citing Gates, supra note 19, at 56-60, 62-65).
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construct a story in which a police officer manufactured and
planted key incriminating evidence and made the constructed
story more plausible to African-American jurors and citizens as
compared to their white counterparts.2 2
1. BACKGROUND EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Like most research on the psychology of juror decision making,
our research on the Story Model has focused on mock-jurors' deci-
sions in criminal cases.23 Our initial research elicited descriptions
of mental representations of evidence and verdict information af-
ter mock-jurors had heard the evidence and judge's instructions.24
In the first studies we established that evidence summaries con-
structed by jurors had a narrative story structure and no other
plausible structures, such as a pro versus con argument structure.
25
In addition, jurors who had rendered different verdicts had con-
structed different stories.26
In a second empirical study we established that mock-jurors
spontaneously constructed causal accounts of the evidence when
rendering verdicts in criminal cases.27 In this study, mockjurors'
responses to sentences presented in a recognition memory task
were used to draw conclusions about mock-jurors' post-decision
representations of evidence. 8 Mock-jurors were more likely to
"recognize" as having been presented as trial evidence sentences
from the story associated with their verdict than sentences from
stories associated with other, rejected verdicts.29
A third experiment was conducted to study the effects of varia-
tions in the order of evidence presentation on judgments. 30 Stories
were predicted to be easy to construct when the evidence was pre-
sented in a temporal sequence that matched the occurrence of the
22. See id.
23. See generally Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story ModelforJuror Decision Mak-
ing, in INSIDE THEJUROR, supra note 1, at 203-31.
24. See generally Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Deci-
sion Making, 51J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242 (1986).
25. See id. at 244.
26. See id. at 248-51.
27. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making: Effects of
Memory Structure on Judgment, 14J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY AND COG-
NITION 521, 523-28 (1988) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Memory Structure].
28. See id. at 521-33.
29. See id. at 528-29.
30. See id. at 528-30.
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original events (Story Order)." Stories were predicted to be diffi-
cult to construct when the presentation order did not match the
sequence of the original events. 32 We based the non-Story Order
on the sequence of evidence presented by witnesses in the original
trial that was the basis of our "stimulus case materials" (Witness
Order). As predicted, mock-jurors were likeliest to convict the de-
fendant when the prosecution evidence was presented in Story
Order and the defense evidence was presented in Witness Order
and they were least likely to convict when the prosecution evidence
was in Witness Order and defense was in Story Order.33
Subsequent research has addressed some practical questions
from the legal trial domain. For example, many criminal cases in-
volve the presentation of only one story, by the prosecution, while
the defense tactic is to "raise reasonable doubts" by attacking the
plausibility of that story3 In these one-sided cases, jurors construct
only one story, and confidence in the verdict is determined by co-
herence and fit of the single story to the verdict category.35 In this
situation, a weak defense story is worse than no story at all; in fact,
a weak prosecution story is bolstered and more guilty verdicts are
rendered when a weak defense story is presented versus no defense
9tory at all.36 Another observation that reinforces the lore of trial
tactics is that when a narrative rhetorical strategy is used to argue a
case, anticipating the story in the attorney's opening statement is
an effective tactic. 7 The probability of obtaining a verdict consis-
tent with a story is increased when the story is "primed" in the
opening statement, all other factors remaining equal. 38
31. See Linda Baker, Processing Temporal Relationships in Simple Stories: Effects of Input Se-
quence, 17J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 559, 569-71 (1978).
32. See Pennington & Hastie, Memory Structure, supra note 27, at 528.
33. See id. at 529.
34. For data from this previously unpublished research, see infra Appendix A.
35. Recent experimental results from the author's laboratory find that a weak defense
story results in slightly elevated conviction rates (48-54 percent) as compared to no defense
story at all (conviction rates of 42-45 percent). This difference was not statistically reliable,
but it is clear that a weak story does not help the defense as compared to having no story at
all. Similar results have been obtained by other researchers. See, e.g., Craig R.M. McKenzie et
a]., When Negative Evidence Increases Confidence: Modeling Change in Confidence After
Hearing Two Sides of a Dispute 5, 14, 19, 23 (Dec. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
36. See id.
37. Cf THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 43-44 (3d ed. 1988)
(discussing story-telling trial tactics).
38. In an unpublished mock-juror decision study, when the prosecution story was
"primed" in an opening statement, convictions increased (conviction rate of 75 percent)
compared to an experimental condition in which the defense story was "primed"
(conviction rate of 40 percent). The difference between these two proportions was statisti-
cally reliable (Chi-squared test, 1 d.f. = 5.01, p < 0.05).
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II. MOST RECENT EMPIRICAL STUDIES: CIVIL CASE DECISIONS
We have also extended the research program to include civil
cases, specifically an application of the explanation-based model to
jurors' reasoning about liability for compensatory and punitive
damages. 9 We presented mock-jurors (citizens sampled from the
Denver area) with four experimental cases, each based on an ac-
tual case in which the plaintiff sought punitive damages. The cases
included fact situations involving four boaters who were drowned
after an inadequate recall of the boat model by the manufacturer,
an injured seaman who was denied maintenance pay after hiring a
lawyer, an employee who was abducted and assaulted in a poorly
guarded shopping mall, and thirty-nine seamen who were lost after
a remodeled molten sulfur carrier sank.4° The defendants were all
large corporations and the plaintiffs were all private citizens. We
employed a typical set of instructions on liability for punitive dam-
ages:
You may award punitive damages only if you find that the
defendant's conduct
(1) was malicious; or
(2) manifested reckless or callous disregard for the
rights of others.
Conduct is malicious if it is accompanied by ill will, or spite,
or if it is for the purpose of injuring another.
In order for conduct to be in reckless or callous disregard of
the rights of others, four factors must be present. First, a de-
fendant must be subjectively conscious of a particular grave
danger or risk of harm, and the danger or risk must be a fore-
seeable and probable effect of the conduct. Second, the
particular danger or risk of which the defendant was subjec-
tively conscious must in fact have eventuated. Third, a
defendant must have disregarded the risk in deciding how to
act. Fourth, a defendant's conduct in ignoring the danger or
risk must have involved a gross deviation from the level of
39. See generally Reid Hastie et al., A Study ofJuror and Juy Judgments in Civil Cases: Decid-
ing Liabilityfor Punitive Damages, 22 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 287 (1998).
40. See id. at 290-91.
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care which an ordinary person would use, having due regard
to all the circumstances.
Reckless conduct is not the same as negligence. Negligence
is the failure to use such care as a reasonable, prudent, and
careful person would use under similar circumstances. Reck-
less conduct differs from negligence in that it requires a
conscious choice of action, either with knowledge of serious
danger to others or with knowledge of facts which would dis-
close the danger to any reasonable person.41
Based on these mock-jurors' written justifications for their ver-
dicts, reinforced by an extensive sample of jurors' discussion
during their deliberations, we developed an interpretation of the
jurors' thought processes in making liability judgments. We pres-
ent a summary of the most conscientious form of the decision
process but, as our results demonstrated, most mock-jurors did not
approach the full level of thoroughness prescribed by this model.43
However, when jurors did address one of the stages in this "fully
conscientious" model, their reasoning usually took the form we
outline below.
In the most general terms, the following stages or events occur
in a modal individual decision process on the issue of liability for
punitive damages.4 First, the juror constructs a summary model of
the events described in the case materials in the form of a chrono-
logical, causally-connected narrative. Since no summary story was
presented in the experimental evidence, arguments, or instruc-
tions, the story construction process is inference-rich and
cognitively demanding. Second, many of the mock-jurors assess the
strength of the causal relationship between the defendant's actions
and the injury claimed by the plaintiff. Third, several of the ele-
ments of "callous or reckless conduct" are considered, associated
with the issues of whether the defendant did or did not make a
conscious choice of action with knowledge or foresight of a serious
danger to other persons. Finally, the elements of "gross deviation
from an ordinary level of care" and malice are considered. With
our case materials, most of these further considerations took
41. Id. at 310-11.
42. See id. at 305-06.
43. See id.
44. See generally id.
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stereotyped forms revealing substantial betweenjuror convergence
on a few common reasoning strategies.45
A follow-up study in which college student mock-jurors were
asked to "think aloud" about their verdicts provides information
about some of these reasoning habits. 46 We asked twenty college
students, volunteers from an introductory psychology class, to
make the punitive damages liability judgment. Each mock-juror
read one case with instructions to "make a legal decision just like
the ones that jurors make in legal trials ... [to] follow the trial
judge's instructions to decide on a verdict." After reading the case
materials they were asked to "think aloud as you make your deci-
sion on the verdict." They were then asked to respond to specific
questions about each of the legal elements mentioned in the
judge's instructions. The contents of the open-ended oral reports
were scored to assess the extent to which the student mock-jurors
considered each of the five elements and the nature of the reason-
ing that they applied to evaluate the elements that they did
consider.47
As in previous studies, we found that the mock-juror's first step
was to construct a narrative summary of the evidence. This sum-
mary included the major events from evidence that the juror
believed occurred, ordered in a temporal sequence. This narrative
included causal linkages, many of them inferred, that served as
"glue" holding the story of the credible evidence together. Con-
tent analyses showed that, for these cases, the explanatory "glue"
usually took the form of inferences about the defendants' motives.
Since the defendants were all corporations, "corporate greed" was
the most common motivational ingredient in the explanations for,
"Yes, liable for punitive damages," decisions. We asked research
assistants to classify the global "think aloud" protocol as represen-
tative of one of three decision making strategies: Did the mock-
juror rely heavily on a chronological, narrative summary of the
evidence? Or did he or she rely on a pro versus con argument
summary? Or did the mock-juror organize his or her thinking in
terms of the legal elements of the liability decision? Or something
else? Fifteen out of the twenty student mock-jurors, or 75 percent,
were rated as relying primarily on narrative evidence summaries in
their verbal "think aloud" reports; three, or 15 percent, responded
45. See id.
46. For data from this unpublished follow-up study, see infra Appendix A.
47. Three research assistants coded the contents of the tape that recorded verbal pro-
tocols; disagreements between the assistants were resolved by accepting the majority (two
out of three) solution. Reliability was high, with the assistants agreeing on the exact code for
over 90 percent of the coded responses.
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in terms of the legal elements;' and two, or 10 percent, were not
classifiable in terms of the three expected strategies.
After constructing an explanatory story, the jurors focused on
key actions of the defendant, the actions that were alleged to be
the causes of the plaintiffs' injuries. Although an explicit judgment
of causation was not mentioned in the judge's instructions, twelve
mock-jurors, or 60 percent, explicitly addressed the causal aspect
of the defendant's actions. Consistent with the relevant legal con-
cepts, this assessment of causal importance emphasized the
"necessity" of the defendant's alleged causal action; seven out of
the twelve respondents who considered the issue, or 58 percent,
clearly performed a rough and ready "necessity test." These mock-
jurors "mutated" the candidate causal event and then
"counterfactually" inferred the probability that the harmful effect
would still have occurred, if the causal event (defendant's action) had
not occurred: If there had been additional guards in a shopping
mall, would the assault on the plaintiff/victim have occurred? If
there had been a recall program with registered letters mailed to
boat owners, would the boat have sunk? When the mock-jurors
judged there was a large difference in the probability of the effect,
as a function of mutating the cause, they then concluded the can-
didate was truly a cause of the effect.49 This observation is especially
interesting because the mock-jurors were relying completely on
their personal notions of what form of "causal test" was appropri-
ate. They were not given instructions on necessity or "but for"
causal relationships in this study, yet they spontaneously adopted
this test when assessing causation.0
Most jurors attempted to apply the judge's instructions on some
of the elements of recklessness. We asked the participants to indi-
cate for each of the major verdict elements, from the judge's
instructions, if they had thoroughly considered the issue and
which aspects of the evidence were most informative on each issue.
48. The participants had a copy of the judge's instructions available when they ren-
dered their verdicts but not when they answered the open-ended question about their
decision process.
49. See NEALJ. ROESE &JAMES M. OLSON, WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN: THE SOCIAL PSY-
CHOLOGY OF COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING 38-40 (1995) (discussing such counter-factual
effects); Gary L. Wells & Igor Gavanski, Mental Simulation of Causality, 56 J. PERSONALITY
SOC. PSYCHOL. 161, 167-69 (1989) (suggesting that causal reasoning is influenced by
thoughts of what reasonably could have occurred).
50. Cf H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 1 (2d ed. 1959)
(arguing that it is the "plain man's notions of causation (and not the philosopher's or the
scientist's) with which the law is concerned" and describing the "but for" (counterfactual
necessity) test for causation). See also Barbara A. Spellman, Crediting Causality, 126 J. Ex-
PERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 323, 323--24 (1997) (stating that the laws regarding causal
responsibility are grounded in common sense notions of cause).
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As in our high fidelity mock-jury study with citizen participants,
our student mock-jurors rarely covered all of the legal elements on
which they were instructed. We suspect that the rates at which
mock-jurors claimed they had considered legal elements were in-
flated by our procedure of asking them about each element
separately. However, the responses are informative about the rela-
tive rates at which the elements were considered and do provide
qualitative information about the nature of the jurors' evaluations.
Was the defendant conscious of a foreseeable, probable danger
before deciding to act in a manner that resulted in injury to the
plaintiff/victims? Eleven mock-jurors, or 55 percent, said they con-
sidered this issue. They attended to evidence that there were
tangible "warnings" that the situation was risky: Had there been
other violent crimes at the mall where an assault occurred? Had
other similar boats had problems with seaworthiness?
Almost all of the mock-jurors-84 percent, or seventeen out of
twenty-said that they considered the issue of whether, "the par-
ticular danger or risk of which the defendant was subjectively
conscious" had in fact occurred, or "eventuated." The others ac-
knowledged that they had not considered the issue thoroughly, but
they had assumed that the defendant's action and the subsequent
dangerous event was the cause of the plaintiffs injury.
Did the defendant disregard the -risk when deciding to take the
action that caused the plaintiff's injury? Eleven mock-jurors, or 55
percent, said this element played a significant role in their consid-
erations. They looked for evidence that an explicit choice (an "act
of commission"51) had been made by the defendant: A security
company requested the defendant to hire additional guards. The
defendant made a choice between a boat recall campaign or a
warning campaign.
Did the defendant's action exhibit a gross deviation from ordi-
nary care or reasonable conduct? Here the few jurors (30 percent,
or six out of twenty) who considered the issue often reasoned by
counterfactually imagining themselves in the relevant situation
and then inferring what they personally might have done. When
their postdiction of their own behavior was highly discrepant from
the defendant's action, they were likely to conclude the defen-
dant's action was a "gross deviation. 52
51. Mark Spranca et al., Omission and Commission in Judgment and Choice, 27J. EXPERI-
MENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 76, 101-03 (1991) (finding stronger bias in cases where harm
resulted from a deliberate omission or commission).
52. Pennington & Hastie, Reasoning, supra note 15, at 152 (discussing jurors' self
analogies in reasoning about the motives of criminal defendants).
WINTrER 1999]
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Mock-jurors in the original study and in the college student
sample often "imported" personal beliefs and criteria to justify
their judgment that the defendant's action was reckless, e.g., "The
company was greedy; cutting-corners, that's 'reckless';" "They
weren't thinking ahead, anyone would've known the ship was go-
ing to sink;" "Everyone knew it was a dangerous, but they didn't
take proper care, that's 'callous disregard.'"
In a few cases, mock-jurors asked themselves if malice was an as-
pect of the defendant's conduct; six out of twenty, or 30 percent,
said this issue played a role in their decision process. Here, since
there was no explicit evidence relevant to "ill will or spite" in any
of the stimulus case materials, mock-jurors relied on inferences
about the defendant's intent. We could not discern a systematic
pattern of reasoning in their responses.
The contents of the mock-jurors' responses to both the open-
ended and element-specific questions were consistent with our
summary of the modal decision strategy outlined above. However,
only one of the twenty individual mock-jurors fully considered all
of the legal elements that were presented in the judge's instruc-
tions as necessary conditions to conclude that the defendant was
liable for punitive damages. Thus, the model should be viewed as a
framework, with typical jurors instantiating some, but not all, of its
components in their individual decision processes.
CONCLUSION
Our goal in this Article has been modest-to provide an illustra-
tion of what a computational theory of juror decision making
would look like for civil judgments. Our primary assertion is that
jurors' judgments are based on summaries of the evidence struc-
tured as chronological narratives, stories that are created as a
central part of the decision process. We presented a primafacie case
for the validity of this application of the Story Model in the form of
empirical observations from a study of mock-juror decisions on
liability for punitive damages. While our example focused on the
judgment of liability for punitive damages, we believe that the
Story Model is a useful prototype of a general model for juror de-
cision making in all civil cases.
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APPENDIX A: TABLE
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF THE EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF LIABILITY JUDGMENT PROCESSES
PROPORTIONS OF MOCK-JURORS (OUT OF 20) CLASSIFIED BY
THEIR GLOBAL DECISION STRATEGIES
Explanation-based Decision Process .75
Elements-to-Prove Decision Process .15
Something Else .10
1.00
PROPORTIONS OF MOCK-JURORS (OUT OF 20) WHO
CONSIDERED EACH ELEMENT CITED IN THEJUDGE'S
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW IN THEIR DECISION PROCESS
Issue of causation .60
Necessity, "but for," test of causation .35
Subjective consciousness of particular .55
grave danger
Particular danger must have eventuated .85
Disregarded the risk in deciding how to act .55
Conduct involved a gross deviation from the .30
level of care which an ordinary person would
have used
Conduct accompanied by ill will or spite .15
Conduct for the purpose of injuring another .20

